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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic created needs for a) estimating the existing airborne risk of infection from
SARS-CoV-2 in existing facilities and new designs, and b) estimating and comparing the impacts of
engineering and behavioural strategies for contextually reducing that risk. This paper presents the
development of a web application to meet these needs, the Facility Infection Risk Estimator™,1 and its
underlying Wells-Riley based model. The model specifically estimates a) the removal efficiencies of
various settling, ventilation, filtration, and virus inactivation strategies and b) the associated probability
of infection given the room physical parameters and number of individuals infected present with either
influenza or SARS-CoV-2. A review of the underlying calculations and associated literature is provided,
along with the model’s validation against two documented spreading events. The error between
modelled and actual number of additional people infected, normalized by the number of uninfected
people present, ranged from roughly -18.4% to +9.7%. The more certain one can be regarding the input
parameters (such as for new designs or existing buildings with adequate field verification), the smaller
these normalized errors will be, likely less than ±15%, making it useful for comparing the impacts of
different risk mitigation strategies focused on airborne transmission.
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Introduction
At the beginning of the pandemic in early 2020, there was an expressed need from various building
owners, facility managers, occupants, and AEC industry consultants to help evaluate the relative
contribution of different interior COVID-19 risk mitigation strategies. There was a lack of easily
accessible tools and other resources for comparing and ranking different engineering / behavioural
strategies (e.g., increased ventilation, filtration, mask wearing, de-densifying, germicidal UV
technologies, etc.) for a given context based on both a) removal efficiency and b) the probability of
infection. The model presented in this paper and its web-based application1 were developed specifically
to contextually compare and rank available influenza and SARS-CoV-2 mitigation strategies for making
any built environment safer with respect to far-field virus-containing aerosols. Other modes of
transmission exist with varying degrees of relevance for different pathogens, such as fomite or direct
physical contact. Additional risk mitigation strategies are associated with these other modes of
transmission, such as surface cleaning, which are not included in this model. However, the consensus
among many scientists at this point is that the dominant route of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is
airborne.2 There is increasing evidence that this also applies to Influenza and other respiratory
viruses,3,4,5 further indicating a need for tools capable of evaluating the risk mitigation potential relative
to airborne transmission.
Airborne in this case refers to the transmission of viral particles or other pathogens from an infected
individual through the air to an uninfected individual who inhales a quantity of particles sufficient to
result in infection. Aerosols expelled from the infected individual act as the transport “vehicles” for the
pathogens and depending on their size and environmental conditions, may float in the air for hours or
even days. Aerosol science indicates that drops of respiratory fluid approximately 100 μm and less in
diameter may float and evaporate faster than they fall to the ground (though it’s not a hard boundary),6
and therefore for the purposes of this paper are termed aerosols (sometimes labelled droplet nuclei).
For the purposes of this paper, respiratory fluid larger than 100 μm in diameter are labelled droplets and
will generally fall to the ground faster than they evaporate.
Far-field aerosols refer to aerosols beyond six feet from an infected person, and their concentration
level is generally closer to the whole room average aerosol concentration level than for near-field
aerosols.7 Near-field aerosols refer to aerosols within three to six feet of an infected person and occur at
higher concentration levels than far-field aerosols (though as they dissipate throughout the room, they
eventually become far-field aerosols). Far-field aerosols are impacted more than near-field aerosols by
most of the mitigation strategies focused on by this model which also have very little to no impact on
droplets (with settling and masks being the notable exception).
The objectives of this study are to (1) provide a detailed review on the mathematical models and the
published data that describe droplet / aerosol generation and quantum generation of an infected
occupant, removal and inactivation mechanisms and the corresponding infection risk reduction of
different strategies; (2) develop a comprehensive model that can compare and rank those solutions; (3)
validate the model against two documented super-spreading events of SARS-CoV-2 as well as (4) assess

2|Page

the model’s general effectiveness. The authors also discussed the model’s limitations as well as its
assumptions and justifications.

Modelling aerosol transmission and literature review
The probability of infection calculations used by the model of the Facility Infection Risk Estimator™1 are
based on a modified version of the Wells-Riley model of infection.8,9 The starting point9 for this model
includes removal terms for ventilation, building system filtration, and settling. Removal terms for
portable air cleaners, masks, inactivation from RH, and inactivation from upper room UVGI (ultraviolet
germicidal irradiation) were subsequently added. The modified formula is Equation (1):
●

𝑃 = [1 −
exp( V∗

−(𝑞∗𝐼∗𝑝∗𝑠∗𝑡)

vadjusted
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○

)] ∗

(ksettling + λventilation + kfiltration + kRHinactivation + kGUVinactivation + kaircleaner + kmask )

(1)

P = probability of infection
q = quantum of infection (quanta generation rate), discussed further below
I = number of infected individuals, discussed further below
p = pulmonary ventilation rate, discussed further below
s = modified p scaling factor for masks, discussed further below
t = time of exposure, discussed further below
V = volume of the room/space.
ksettling = settling removal factor, discussed further below
λventilation = ventilation removal factor, discussed further below
kfiltration = building system filtration removal factor, discussed further below
kRHinactivationIVA or kRHinactivationSC2 = RH inactivation removal factor, discussed further below
kUVGIinactivationIVA or kUVGIinactivationSC2 = upper room UVGI inactivation removal factor,
discussed further below
λaircleaner = portable air cleaner removal factor, discussed further below
kmask = mask removal factor, discussed further below
vadjusted = adjusted vaccination factor, discussed further below

Quantum of infection
The Wells-Riley model is “… based on a concept of ‘quantum of infection, whereby the rate of
generation of infectious airborne particles (or quanta - q) can be used to model the likelihood of an
individual in a steady-state well-mixed indoor environment being exposed to the infectious particles and
subsequently succumbing to infection.”9
The quanta generation rate, q, is a “hypothetical infectious dose unit” that is typically estimated using
epidemiological studies. This single number, in units of 1/hr, is an amalgamation of “... the amount of
particles generated over time and the infectivity of particles, which also inherently captures
susceptibility of individuals and particle size effects such as the probability of deposition in relevant
regions of the respiratory system” and must be determined for each pathogen.8
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This model varies the quanta per hour by selected activity level and expiratory event, for either
influenza or SARS-CoV-2. Both activity level, primarily through breathing (or pulmonary ventilation)
rates, and expiratory means (speaking, breathing, coughing, etc.) influence the initial size and quantity
of the virus-containing droplets / aerosols, the varying concentration levels of virus particles within the
droplets / aerosols, the potential for a non-infected individual to breathe them in, and the potential that
they will reach deep enough in the lungs to cause an infection. Therefore, they impact the quantum of
infection value.
Table 1: Quantum generation rate estimate (quanta per hour)

Activity

Influenza Quantum Generation Rate SARS-CoV-2 Quantum Generation Rate
Estimate (Quanta per hour)
Estimate (Quanta per hour)
Low Shedder

Medium
Shedder

High
Shedder

Low Shedder

Medium
Shedder

High
Shedder

Breathing / Resting

3.2

35.0

68.0

4.0

15.8

28.0

Speaking, Coughing, or Sneezing /
Resting

6.6

72.3

140.5

16.0

50.2

85.7

Loudly Speaking or Singing /
Resting

29.6

324.2

630.0

97.0

382.5

679.0

Breathing / Light

3.5

38.5

74.8

4.4

17.4

30.8

Speaking, Coughing, or Sneezing /
Light

7.3

79.5

154.6

21.0

65.9

112.5

Loudly Speaking or Singing / Light

32.6

356.6

693.0

134.0

528.5

938.0

Breathing / Moderate

4.6

49.9

96.9

5.7

22.5

39.9

Speaking, Coughing, or Sneezing /
Moderate

9.4

103.0

200.2

26.5

83.2

142.0

Loudly Speaking or Singing /
Moderate

42.2

462.0

897.8

170.0

670.4

1190.0

Breathing / Heavy

10.6

116.3

226.1

13.3

52.5

93.1

Speaking, Coughing, or Sneezing /
Heavy

22.0

240.4

467.2

63.7

199.9

341.3

Loudly Speaking or Singing / Heavy

98.6

1077.9

2094.8

408.0

1609.0

2856.0

Table 1 above lists the quantum generation rates by expiratory means / activity level for both influenza
and SARS-CoV-2 that are used in this model. In addition, separate values are provided for low, medium,
and high shedders. These values are taken directly from and/or estimated from the values and sources
listed in Table 2 as well as the Airborne Infection Risk Calculator manual.10 Due to conflicting data and
opinions in the research relative to varying quantum generation rates between adults and children,11,12
the model currently assumes the same rate for both children and adults.
The model allows the user to select from the following expiratory means: Breathing, Speaking, Loudly
Speaking or Singing, Coughing, and Sneezing. These specific categories were used to coordinate the
quanta generation by expiratory means with the droplet / aerosol size ranges produced by expiratory
means (discussed below in the Settling Removal Factor section). The following activity levels are
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available to select from: Resting (sitting, reading, sleeping, and watching TV), Light (standing and most
domestic or office work), Moderate (climbing stairs and light exercise), and Heavy (vigorous exercise).
These specific categories were used to coordinate the quanta generation by activity level with
pulmonary ventilation rates, discussed further below.
Table 2: Referenced quantum generation rate studies

Activity

Virus

Quantum Generation Rate Estimate
(Quanta per hour)

Notes

Breathing / Sitting

influenza

15 - 12813

Highly infectious /
superspreader range

Breathing / Sitting

influenza

<3.2 - 2014

High degree of uncertainty

Breathing / Sitting

influenza

LR: 15; IR: 76.18; HR: 12815

LR, IR, HR - low, intermediate, high risk

Breathing / Sitting

influenza

51516

Airflight Outbreak / highly infectious

Breathing / Sitting

influenza

0.17 - 63017

LR/symptomatic to HR/asymptomatic

Breathing / Sitting

influenza

33.9 - 67.811

No indication of level of risk /
superspreader

Breathing / Sitting

influenza

68.6718

Mean value of Rudnick and Milton13 - HR

Breathing / Sitting

SARS-CoV-2

<119

Symptomatic infectious subject

Vocalization /
Light Activity

SARS-CoV-2

>100 (1030)19

Asymptomatic infectious subject;
walking slowly

Speaking / Light
Activity

SARS-CoV-2

14219

Asymptomatic infectious subject; worst
case

Breathing / Sitting

SARS-CoV-2

LR: 11.4; IR: 28.94; HR: 295.515

Using SARS-CoV-1 as a proxy

Breathing / Sitting

SARS-CoV-2

0.3620

Asymptomatic subject; Assuming low
risk; Preprint

Breathing / Heavy
Activity

SARS-CoV-2

2.420

Asymptomatic subject; Assuming low
risk; Preprint

Speaking / Light
Activity

SARS-CoV-2

4.920

Asymptomatic subject; Assuming low
risk; Preprint

Singing / Light
Activity

SARS-CoV-2

3120

Asymptomatic subject; Assuming low
risk; Preprint

Singing / Light
Activity

SARS-CoV-2

970 [680-1190]21

Asymptomatic; High Risk
(superspreader); Preprint

? (Breathing /
Sitting)

SARS-CoV-2

14 - 4822

Fitted quantum generation rate w/ R0;
Preprint
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Oral Breathing
(Lecturing)

SARS-CoV-2

4.412

Assuming low risk

Speaking
(Lecturing)

SARS-CoV-2

2112

Assuming low risk

Loud Speaking
(Lecturing) /
Singing

SARS-CoV-2

13412

Assuming low risk

Oral Breathing /
Sitting (Student)

SARS-CoV-2

412

Assuming low risk

Speaking / Sitting
(Student)

SARS-CoV-2

1612

Assuming low risk

Loud Speaking
(sitting) / singing

SARS-CoV-2

9712

Assuming low risk

Number of infected individuals
The model allows the option of selecting one or more infected individuals. Each infected individual is
assumed to have the same expiratory means, activity level, quantum of infection, and pulmonary
ventilation rate.

Pulmonary ventilation (breathing)
Breathing rate is important to consider as it impacts the amount of virus potentially inhaled. It is also
important to factor in the variation between adults and children. Adult and child pulmonary ventilation
rates by activity level are determined using Table 6-31 from the EPA’s Exposure Factors Handbook.23 The
Total Daily IR (inhalation rate) value for an adult average, divided by 24 hours, was used to provide the
adult pulmonary ventilation rate for these calculations, representing ages 18 and older. The Total Daily
IR value for a 10-year-old child, divided by 24 hours, was used to provide the child pulmonary ventilation
rate for these calculations, representing ages less than 18 years of age.

Modified p scaling factor (masks)
The mask effective efficiency value, discussed further below in the Removal and Inactivation Factors
section, is used to calculate a scaling factor that scales the rate at which quanta of infection are
breathed in as a result of wearing a mask.24 This is described by Equation (2)
●

modified p scaling factor(s) = 1 − (mask effective efficiency ∗ % non −
infected wearing a mask)

(2)

The unmodified p scaling factor (1 – mask effective efficiency)24 was modified to account for the
potential that not all non-infected individuals are wearing a mask. The model allows one to input the
percentage of infected and non-infected individuals wearing a mask. The unmodified p scaling factor
values used for the different mask types are listed below in Table 5, discussed in the Removal and
Inactivation Factors section.
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Time of exposure
The model allows one to enter the time of exposure in hours. Exposure time will vary by a) facility type,
b) the different occupants present in the facility, and c) the different activities they undertake during the
day. For example, if an infected individual is present in a room, the exposure time of elementary
students could be significantly more than an office worker meeting with an infected coworker for 20
minutes in a conference room.

Removal and inactivation factors
Research indicates aerosol transmission is likely a predominant route for the transmission of many
viruses,8,25,26 including influenza and SARS-CoV-2. Reducing the threat from virus-containing aerosols
indoors, once the virus particles have been expirated from an infected person, is accomplished by
removing or inactivating them before non-infected individuals have an opportunity to inhale them. The
removal and inactivation mechanisms addressed in this model include settling (via gravity), ventilation
(via outdoor air), filtration (via the building HVAC system, portable air cleaners, and/or mask wearing),
and virus inactivation (via relative humidity and/or upper room UVGI). Each of these is discussed in more
detail below.

Settling removal factor
Environmental conditions impact the rate of settlement due to gravity. Air flow may keep smaller
droplets / aerosols in the air longer and relative humidity (RH) plays a large role in the size of the
droplets / aerosols after leaving the infected host.26,27 Droplets evaporate faster at lower RH levels,
increasing their likelihood of staying aloft longer. Temperature also affects settling velocity through its
impact on the dynamic viscosity of air; the warmer the temperature the higher the dynamic viscosity
and the slower the settling velocity. As the dynamic viscosity of air doesn’t vary significantly over the
narrow temperature setpoint range found in most occupied spaces (68OF - 76OF (20OC - 24.4OC)),28 the
dynamic viscosity for a temperature of 72.5OF (22.5OC) at one atmosphere of pressure is used for this
model.
The means of expiration must also be considered because they impact the quantity and size of viruscontaining droplets / aerosols that are released from an infected individual. This model uses a weighted
average initial diameter for these droplets / aerosols (immediately after expiration) to estimate the
removal efficiency associated with settling and the associated impact on the probability of infection.
Table 3 provides the average initial droplet / aerosol diameters used by this model for the following
expiratory means: breathing, speaking normally, speaking loudly, singing, coughing, and sneezing, based
on the references listed.
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Table 3: Initial and equilibrium droplet / aerosol weighted average GM by expiratory means
Droplet
Estimated
Calced
Calced
Calced
Calced
GM (μm) % Infectious
% Infectious
% Infectious
% Infectious
% Infectious Weighted
Initial
Measurement Expiratory
Droplet
Droplet
Droplet
Droplet
Equilibrium
Calculated Droplets or %
Droplets or %
Droplets or %
Droplets or %
Droplets or % Average
Weighted
Range (μm)
Event
GM
GM
GM
GM
vs Initial
by the Concentration
Concentration
Concentration
Concentration
Concentration GM (μm)
Average
(μm)
(μm)
(μm)
(μm)
team
GM (μm)
Assumed
0.3-?
Breathing
0.4
70%
0.7
17%
2.2
13%
0.7
1.414
Equil.
0.3-10

Breathing

0.4

82%

2.2

18%

0.7

Assumed
Equil.

1.429

0.05-50

Breathing

0.2

90%

5.0

10%

0.7

Assumed
Equil.

1.330

0.5-20

Breathing

0.8

86%

1.8

9%

1.1

Assumed
Equil.

2.131

0.3-20

Breathing

0.6

64%

1.1

36%

0.7

Assumed
Equil.

1.532

3.5

3%

5.5

2%

Breathing Average

0.8

Breathing Average, Infected Only

0.7

0.5-20

Speaking
softly

0.8

85%

1.8

11%

3.5

3%

5.5

1%

0.5-20

Speaking
normal

0.8

73%

1.8

21%

3.5

2%

5.5

4%

0.3-20

Speaking
normal

0.5

79%

1.3

21%

0.3-20+

Speaking
normal

0.8

43%

1.2

54%

0.3-20+

Speaking
normal

0.8

44%

1.2

56%

0.5-20

Speaking
loudly

0.8

69%

1.8

13%

0.3-20

Speaking
loudly

0.5

39%

1.3

61%
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145

3.5

3%

13%

5.5

5%

1.5
1.4

1.0

Assumed
Equil.

2.131

1.3

Assumed
Equil.

2.531

0.7

Assumed
Equil.

1.332

5.3

Equil.

10.733

1.0

Equil.

2.133

1.5

Assumed
Equil.

3.031

1.0

Assumed
Equil.

2.032

Speaking Normal Average w/ O-mode

2.4

4.8

Speaking Normal Average w/out O-mode

1.0

2.0

Speaking Loudly Average

1.3

2.5

0.3-20

Singing
average

0.5

44%

1.1

56%

0.9

Assumed
Equil.

1.732

0.3-20

Singing
loudly

0.6

34%

1.3

66%

1.0

Assumed
Equil.

2.132

Singing Average

1.0

2.1

?

Cough

0.5

15%

1.7

25%

5.5

60%

3.8

Assumed
Equil.

?

Cough

0.5

35%

2.0

23%

6.3

42%

3.3

Assumed
Equil.

6.634

0.3-?

Cough

1.5

100%

1.5

Assumed
Equil.

3.135

0.5-20

Cough

0.8

83%

1.8

14%

3.5

2%

1.0

Assumed
Equil.

2.131

0.3-20+

Cough

0.8

40%

0.8

54%

123.0

6%

8.1

Equil.

16.333

0.3-20+

Cough

0.8

43%

0.8

57%

0.8

Equil.

1.633

5.5

1%

7.69

Coughing Average w/ O-mode

3.6

7.1

Coughing Average w/out O-mode

2.1

4.2

Coughing Average, Infected Only

2.9

5.8

0.1-1000

Sneeze

Unimodal distribution; size class w/ most droplets: 341.5 - 398.1 µm

360.1

Assumed
Initial

NA36

0.1-1000

Sneeze

Bimodal distribution; size class w/ most droplets: 73.6 - 85.8 µm

74.4

Assumed
Initial

NA36

?

Sneeze

29.0

Assumed
Initial

NA37
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1.4

3%

2.8

16%

5.7

35%

11.3

28%

126.5

19%

Sneezing Average

154.5

NA

Sneezing Average, Excluding Unimodal distribution

51.7

NA

The table lists different measured droplet / aerosol (particle) diameter ranges (first column) associated
with a specific expiratory means (second column) pulled from the various studies referenced in the last
column. Within that overall range, as provided by the studies, the subsequent series of paired columns
list a) calculated GMs (geometric mean diameters) for various bins of particle size ranges and b) an
associated percentage. This percentage consists of either a) the percentage of infectious particles within
the bin relative to the infectious particles from the overall particle size range or b) the percentage
concentration of particles within the bin relative to the concentration of particles from the overall
particle size range. For the referenced studies where it was possible, these series of paired columns are
used to calculate the weighted average GM (third column from the end) using the following method9.
The percentages of infectious particles contained within each associated bin of droplet / aerosol
(particle) distribution ranges were multiplied by the GM from each of these bins, and then these
products added together to get the weighted average GM for each referenced study.
However, because only a few studies involved infected volunteers, additional studies involving healthy
individuals also had to be referenced. In these cases, the percentage concentration for each bin of
droplet / aerosol size ranges as opposed to the percentage of infectious particles contained within each
bin was used to determine the weighted average GM. Most of the studies reported equilibrium sizes for
the droplet / aerosol size ranges (or were assumed to), which are the size of droplets / aerosols after
reaching equilibrium with environmental conditions, primarily driven by RH.38 To estimate the initial
weighted average GM (the last column), the equilibrium sizes were divided by an evaporation factor of
0.5.33
For each expiratory means, the size values from the relevant studies were averaged together to reach
the final weighted average values used by the model. Where possible, the final selected average was
determined from studies making use of only infected individuals. O-mode size distribution ranges were
excluded due to available research suggesting greater concentrations of viral particles occur in smaller
droplets / aerosols.14,27,30,31,34,35,39,40,41 These and other averages discarded for use in the model are
crossed out in the table. In order to coordinate with the quanta generation by expiratory means
(discussed above), speaking loudly and singing were combined into a single expiratory event, using the
initial droplet / aerosol diameters for speaking loudly.
To calculate the settling removal efficiency (Esettling), the initial and equilibrium droplet / aerosol
diameters are needed. As discussed above, Table 3 provides the average initial droplet / aerosol
diameters used by this model. Equilibrium particle diameters are then calculated using an average of the
model-based experimentally derived respiratory droplet size transformation ratios (the last column in
Table 4) that corresponds to the relevant room RH, shown in Table 4.38
Table 4: Respiratory droplet / aerosol size transformation average Deq/Di ratios
Model-based Deq/Di ratios
RH
10%
20%
30%
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Di = 0.1 μm

Di = 1.0 μm

Di = 10.0 μm

0.401
0.407
0.412

0.402
0.407
0.412

0.402
0.407
0.412

Experimentally
derived Deq/Di
ratios

Average Deq/Di
ratios

0.391
0.395
0.398

0.399
0.404
0.409

40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%

0.416
0.422
0.429
0.439
0.456
0.49

0.417
0.423
0.431
0.443
0.464
0.513

0.417
0.424
0.432
0.444
0.465
0.516

0.401
0.427
0.437
0.449
0.464
0.502

0.413
0.424
0.432
0.444
0.462
0.505

Settling velocities are calculated referencing particle densities42 and the Stokes Law formula;38 v = (g *
Deq * ⍴) / (18 * μ); g = gravitational acceleration, ⍴ = particle density, μ = dynamic viscosity of air. The
final formula for ksettling is Equation (3).
●

ksettling = v/H
○ v = settling velocity
○ H = height of the room/space

(3)

Ventilation removal factor
Ventilation refers to the introduction of outside air into a space. It has the impact of diluting
contaminants, including virus-containing aerosols, which in turn increases the amount of time required
to inhale an infectious dose of virus. The continued introduction of outside air also displaces the same
amount of air within the space, removing contaminants in the process, though due to mixing it is not an
immediate one to one replacement.8,27,43
Ventilation may be supplied mechanically through HVAC systems or naturally through operable windows
or other intentional or unintentional openings in the building envelope. Recommended ventilation rates
will vary depending on factors such as the space or facility type, the activities being conducted, and the
density of people present. Ventilation removal efficiency (Eventilation) is dependent on ventilation rates for
the room/space in question and entered as the total OA (outside air) in cubic feet per minute (cfm).
kventilation equates to the outside air changes per hour for the room/space, calculated using the entered
OA per space and the space volume. Design ventilation rates are often not readily available unless one
has access to as-built drawings and actual ventilation rates will often vary from design ventilation rates.
Engineers, commissioning agents, and/or test and balance (TAB) consultants may need to be consulted
to verify actual ventilation rates or determine a close approximation.

Filtration removal factor – filters inside building systems
Filtration refers to a physical medium used to “capture” contaminants, including droplets / aerosols,
from the air as it passes through the medium. For building systems, filters follow a Minimum Efficiency
Reporting Values (MERV) rating system, with values ranging from 1 on the low end all the way up to 16.
The ratings provide an indication of how effective a filter is at removing particles of varying size ranges
out of the air.8,9,44 Filtration is effective if a) the contaminants are airborne, such as virus-containing
aerosols, and b) the clean air delivery is high enough.8,9,45,46,47 Clean air delivery is a function of the
filter’s efficiency and the recirculated air rate.
The building system filter removal efficiency (ηfilter) percentages for various MERV and HEPA ratings used
are taken from aerosol-weighted values given in another source’s Table 4.9 The available MERV and
HEPA input selections are limited to the levels used in this table. Users must select the value closest to
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their existing and/or proposed conditions. Recirculated air changes per hour (λrecirculation), entered as CFM
per space, are needed to calculate the overall filtration removal efficiency (Efiltration). The final formula for
kfiltration is Equation (4).
●

kfiltration = λrecirculation ∗ ηfilter
○ λrecirculation = recirculated air changes per hour for the room/space
○ ηfilter = building system filter removal efficiency

(4)

As with ventilation rates, engineers, commissioning agents, and/or TAB consultants may need to be
consulted to determine what filter rating and recirculated air rate should be used.

Filtration removal factor - portable air cleaners
Portable air cleaners are also available for use to supplement building system filtration and ventilation.
Units sold in the U.S. should have a clean air delivery rate (CADR) corresponding to a recommended
room volume. This model requires entering the CADR value of the unit(s) being used, and these ratings
are typically provided by the manufacturer for smoke, dust, and pollen. Some research14,34,48,49 ,50
suggests that a greater percentage of infectious viral particles (approximate 60% to over 90% for the
studies referenced) are found in smaller droplets / aerosols, potentially 5 microns or less in diameter.
This droplet / aerosol size range is more reflective of smoke and dust than pollen,51 therefore this model
requires the average of the smoke and dust CADR rating be entered.
The removal rate per portable air cleaner, λaircleaner, equals the CADR (clean air delivery rate) value from
the manufacturer divided by the space volume (V),51 as shown in Equation (5).
●

λaircleaner = CADR / V

(5)

This value is then multiplied by the number of portable air cleaners being used per space to provide the
total removal rate (1/h).

Filtration removal factor - masks
The last type of filtration accounted for by this model are masks, which block large droplets and filter a
percentage of virus-containing aerosols from the air exhaled by an infected individual as well as from
the surrounding air before they are inhaled by a non-infected individual.30,52 The efficiency of a mask, or
the percentage of aerosols with virus particles filtered out, depends on a) the removal efficiency of the
mask material itself relative to the different size distributions of droplets / aerosols and flow rate
through the mask and b) the leakage that occurs around the mask edges.24,53,54,55,56,57,58,59
Leakage is largely related to how well the mask fits a person. The pressure drop across the mask
material also impacts its usability as the greater the pressure drop, the harder it is to breathe through.
Greater pressure drops may also result in greater leakage rates, especially if the fit is poor because more
particles will follow the path of least resistance through the gaps between the face and mask. The mask
removal efficiency (Emask) is calculated looking at the following two components, added together.
Mask removal efficiency, part 1: This part consists of the amount of droplets / aerosols removed from
the room air by the masks of the non-infected individuals as they breath in (Equation (6) below) and is a
small contribution compared to part 2. It is calculated using the mask effective efficiency (ηmask), the
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number of non-infected individuals wearing them, and the estimated breathing generated air change
rate across an individual mask of 1.2 cfm (2.0 m3/hr),56 as shown in Equation (6)
mask removal for non − infected =
(

60minutes
hr

1.2cfm ∗ % non−infected wearing mask ∗ number of non−infected occupants ∗
room volume

)∗

mask effective efficiency

(6)

The estimated breathing generated air change rate used here represents respiration rates at rest. This
model uses Mask Effective Efficiency (ηmask) values shown in Table 5 below (labelled Fitted Filtration
Efficiency (%)). These come from a study54 that directly measured the fitted filtration efficiency (FEE),
accounting for both mask efficiency and face seal leakage, or mask fit.
In this study the FixTheMask add on consisted of a rubber band configuration mimicking the impacts of
the FixTheMask mask fitter, resulting in a measured FFE of 78.2%. Another study60 actually tested the
manufactured FixTheMask mask fitter on a procedure mask using a similar particle range as the above
study, though manikins were used instead of an actual person. The effective mask efficiency, or fitted
filtration efficiency, was found to be 94.9%. For the model, these two values were averaged, giving an
FFE of 86.6%.
Table 5: Filtration efficiencies and p scaling factor for masks used in this model54

No mask
2-layer woven nylon mask w/ ear loops w/out aluminium nose bridge
2-layer woven nylon mask w/ ear loops, w/ aluminium nose bridge
2-layer woven nylon mask w/ ear loops, w/ aluminium nose bridge &
1 nonwoven insert
Cotton bandana, folded "bandit" style
Single-layer woven polyester gaiter/neck cover
Single-layer woven polyester/nylon mask w/ ties
Nonwoven polypropylene mask w/ fixed ear loops
3-layer woven cotton mask w/ ear loops
Surgical mask w/ ties
Procedure mask w/ ear loops
Procedure mask w/ ear loops & 3D printed ear guard
Procedure mask w/ ear loops & FixTheMask
N95

Fitted Filtration Efficiency (%)
0.2 μm - 0.3 μm
0
44.7%
56.3%

p scaling
factor
0
55.3%
43.7%

74.4%
49.0%
37.8%
39.3%
28.6%
26.5%
71.5%
38.5%
61.7%
86.6%
98.4%

25.6%
51.0%
62.2%
60.7%
71.4%
73.5%
28.5%
61.5%
38.3%
13.4%
1.6%

Mask removal efficiency, part 2: This part consists of the amount of droplets / aerosols removed by the
masks from the air breathed out by the infected individual(s), before they enter the room air, as shown
in Equation (7).
●

source reduction = (mask effective efficiency ∗ % infected wearing a mask)

The final formula for kmask is then Equation (8).
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(7)

●

kmask = (mask removal for non − infected + source reduction)

(8)

Inactivation – RH removal factor
Inactivation refers to a process of rendering a virus non-infectious. This model focuses on two types of
inactivation. The first is in relation to relative humidity (RH), as research indicates that for typical interior
temperature ranges, most viruses, including membrane-bound viruses like SARS-CoV-2 and influenza,
find low (< 40%) and high (>90%) RH levels more conducive to survival with increased decay rates
occurring at intermediate RH levels.25,27,61,62,63 As droplets / aerosols evaporate after expiration, the
concentration levels of proteins, salts, etc., within them increase, creating conditions unfavourable to
the virus and likely speeding up its inactivation, though additional research is needed to understand the
nuances of how this varies by virus type, strain, phenotypic characteristics, temperature, and specific
respiratory fluid characteristics. For the purposes of this model, a linear relationship is assumed for
influenza27 and SARS-CoV-2.64
While temperature impacts virus inactivation,25 there doesn’t does not appear to be significant variation
in virus decay over the narrow temperature setpoint range found in most occupied spaces, 68OF - 76OF
(20OC - 24.4OC).27 For the purposes of the model, an interior temperature of 22.5°C (72.5°F) and
associated dynamic viscosity of air of 1.83x10-5 is assumed. For SARS-CoV-2, an interior temperature of
72OF (22.2 OC) is assumed to coordinate the constraints of the Department of Homeland Security
calculator64 used to estimate the virus’ inactivation due to RH (discussed further below). These
assumptions also coordinate with the interior temperature assumptions made for settling discussed
above.
The influenza A virus inactivation rate (kRHinactivationIVA) due to relative humidity (RH) entered is calculated
using Equation (9)38
●

kRHinactivationIVA = (0.0438 ∗ RH) – 0.00629

(9)

For SARS-CoV-2, the inactivation rate (kRHinactivationSC2) is calculated using Equation (10)
●

kRHinactivationSC2 = (0.0135 ∗ RH) – 0.0028
(10)

The equation was developed using a web application developed by the Department of Homeland
Security.64 Decay rates were determined using this calculator for a UV Index of 0 (inside) and an interior
assumed temperature of 72OF (22.2OC) to correspond to assumptions made for influenza and droplet
evaporation. Note that the Department of Homeland Security calculator only provided values between a
RH of 20+% and 70%. Table 6 then converts these values to 1/min, which were then graphed and
Equation (10) formulated for the 99% decay rate values.
Table 6: SARS-CoV-2 inactivation / decay rate (min-1)
RH
21%
22%
23%
25%

50% Decay (min-1)
0.000406702
0.001304121
0.002201673
0.003996803
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90% Decay (min-1)
0.000122441
0.000392711
0.000662954
0.001203369

99% Decay (min-1)
6.12205x10-5
0.000196356
0.000331477
0.000601685

30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%

0.008503401
0.013020833
0.01754386
0.021929825
0.026455026
0.030864198
0.035460993
0.03968254
0.043859649

0.002556237
0.003903201
0.005257624
0.006613757
0.007974482
0.009310987
0.010683761
0.011990408
0.013333333

0.001277139
0.001953888
0.002628812
0.003306878
0.003977725
0.004655493
0.005324814
0.006016847
0.00669344

Inactivation – upper room UVGI removal factor
The second type of inactivation focused on in this model is Upper Room UVGI (ultraviolet germicidal
irradiation). A sufficient dosage of ultraviolet radiation will inactivate viruses (by photochemical
disruption of viral RNA upon absorbing UV photons), with the UV-C band of energy (wavelengths
between 100 and 280 nm) having the greatest germicidal effect.43,65,66,67 Upper room applications of this
technology make use of UV radiation generating lamp sources (low/medium pressure mercury vapor
lamps or UVC-LEDs), either wall mounted or suspended from the ceiling, to irradiate upper air zones of
individual spaces while shielding the lower occupied zones from harmful UV radiation.66,67,68,69,70,71
Substantial evidence exists for the effectiveness of Upper Room UVGI systems in killing various
pathogens, including coronaviruses.46,72
Germicidal effectiveness of these systems is influenced by spatial configuration, the location, number,
and power of the UV fixtures, relative humidity, the airflow and air mixing that occurs between the
lower occupied zone and upper irradiated zone, and the type of pathogen and its source(s). Of all these
influences, the air up flow rate perhaps has the most impact, as this determines the speed with which
pathogens are carried up into the irradiated zone to be eliminated, as well as how long they are
irradiated, impacting the dose received. However, this simplified model assumes a well-mixed condition
and only indirectly accounts for the impact of the airflow rate and ACH (discussed further below).
The upper room UVGI coefficient of inactivation (or removal factor) is calculated by multiplying the UVGI
system's upper room average irradiance or fluency (E) by the relevant susceptibility parameter (Z) for
either influenza or SARS-CoV-2,66,67,68,69,70,73,74,75,76,77 as shown in Equation (11)
●

[kUVGIinactivationIVA or kUVGIinactivationSC2] = E ∗ Z
(11)

Sources, including the 2009 NIOSH application guideline, recommend that the upper room average
irradiance (E) should generally fall within the range of 30 - 50 µW/cm2 for most pathogens.67,75
But the final average value depends on the number of lamps, their individual output, fixture
configuration, fixture layout, and room parameters. Measured and modelled values often fall below this
range.67,70,75 It will likely be necessary to coordinate with a design engineer and/or manufacturer to
determine an appropriate estimate for a given setting. For these calculations, the effective average
irradiance (E) for the whole space is used instead of the upper room average irradiance and is estimated
by multiplying the upper room average irradiance by the ratio of upper room volume to total room
volume.75,78 Under well mixed conditions (obtained via ceiling fans, the building mechanical system, or
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some combination), some research78 indicates the whole room average irradiance value adequately
accounts for the effects of air turnover rates between the upper and lower zones for all fan speeds of
conventional low-velocity ceiling fans. Though potential conditions of stagnation or greater than six
ACH43 will likely produce results overestimating the effectiveness of the upper room UVGI system.
Reported susceptibility parameter (Z), or UV rate constant, values (m2/J) for influenza A include 0.15,73
0.27,79 0.29 at 25-27% RH,74 0.27 at 50-54% RH,74 and 0.22 at 81-84% RH.74 In order to tie the Z value to
RH, the last three values were used; see Table 7 below. The second RH range column was added to tie it
to the RH ranges accounted for by this model.
Table 7: Estimated Z values for influenza aerosols determined at low, medium, and high relative
humidity (modified from table 174)
RH range (%) RH Range (%)
25 - 27
50 - 54
81 - 84

0% - 33%
34% - 66%
67% - 100%

Estimated Z
Value (m2/J)
0.29
0.27
0.22

95% Confidence Interval
Lower
Upper
0.27
0.31
0.26
0.31
0.21
0.23

R2
0.985
0.991
0.992

Reported susceptibility parameter (Z), or UV rate constant, values (m2/J) for SARS-CoV-2 include the
suggestion16 for 0.377 (best-case) and 0.0377 m2/J (worst-case) and the suggestion72 of 0.05524 m2/J. At
this point there are no known studies linking the susceptibility parameter (Z) for SARS-CoV-2 to RH, so
for the purposes of this model, an average of 0.377 and 0.0377 m2/J was used (0.207 m2/J).
The relationship between ACH, ventilation and UVGI is not fully understood.24 Greater ACH levels within
lower ranges can positively impact room mixing, aiding in UVGI's effectiveness by increasing the
percentage of pathogens exposed at a faster rate. But greater ACH rates also decrease its effectiveness
relative to delivered dosage by decreasing the amount of exposure time for the pathogens in question.
Future versions may look at incorporating these parameters, but for now the effective average
irradiance for the whole space is used to partially account for not directly estimating the impacts of ACH
or air turnover rates on delivered dosage, as discussed above.

Adjusted vaccination factor
The model also accounts for the impacts of vaccination for influenza. Default influenza U.S. coverage
rates for children (57%) and adults (42%) are provided based on averages of nine consecutive flu
seasons for each, calculated from data provided by the CDC.80 However, users of the model may modify
these default values if desired. As COVID vaccinations are still rolling out and yet to be approved for
children under 12 (as of this paper’s publication), local vaccination percentages are recommended to be
used to guide the input for the percentage of adults and children 12 and over who are vaccinated.
To integrate the impact of vaccination into these calculations, the relationship between the probability
of infection calculated by this model and the basic reproduction number, R0 is used. R0 is "... defined as
the expected number of secondary cases produced by a single (typical) infection in a completely
susceptible population,"81 and the probability of infection is one of three factors multiplied by each
other to calculate R0.
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The impact of vaccination on the reproduction number can be estimated using Equation (12).
●

R0p = (1 − p) ∗ R0

(12)

"where R0p is the R0 under vaccination and p is the vaccination coverage rate of the population who have
been vaccinated."11 This model uses the relationship between R0 and the probability of infection to
estimate the impact of vaccination on the probability of infection, essentially multiplying it by (1-p). As
vaccinations are not 100% effective, the p value for children and adults is also multiplied by estimates of
influenza vaccination effectiveness for children (0.70) and adults (0.62).82 This provides the adjusted
vaccination factor (vadjusted) applicable for influenza.
For SARS-CoV-2, adult efficacy percentages for the most prominent vaccines are listed in Table 8 (also
used as a proxy for those 12 to 15 years of age as of this paper’s publication. These have been obtained
from the sources listed for each vaccine. As indicated in the table, the efficacies for Johnson and
Johnson were determined for both moderate to severe and severe symptoms. Cells with dashes indicate
no formal efficacy values are available at this point. Though preliminary data does indicate the efficacy
of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines is less for the variants. Due to limited data and uncertainty regarding
the variants, it was decided to use one estimated efficacy value, averaging all of the percentages listed
in Table 8 together, resulting in a value of 0.80. As more efficacy data becomes available, the model will
be updated. The model currently does not allow one to account for any immunity generated through
previous community infections. In those cases where a large number of such individuals (who are also
unvaccinated) may be present within a building population, the results will overestimate the probability
of infection to an unknown degree.
Table 8: SARS-CoV-2 Vaccine Efficacy
Adults
Original
Vaccine

Pfizer–
BioNTech83,84
Moderna83,84
Johnson and
Johnson83,85
Novovax86
Overall Average

Symptom
atic moderate
to severe

B.1.351 (South
African)

B.1.1.7 (UK)

P.1 (Brazil)

Symptom
atic moderate
to severe

Symptom
atic severe

Symptom
atic moderate
to severe

Symptom
atic severe

Symptom
atic moderate
to severe

Symptom
atic severe

94.8%

--

--

--

--

--

--

94.1%

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

85.0%

57.0%

85.0%

66.0%

85.0%

--

--

72.0%

Symptom
atic severe

85.0%

95.6%

85.6%

60.0%
80.4%

Validation of model against previous infection cases
To demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the web application1 and its underlying model, it has
been used to model the outcomes of two documented superspreading events: the Skagit Valley Chorale
Superspreading Event21 and the Guangzhou Restaurant Event.87,88,89
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Skagit Valley chorale superspreading event
In March of 2021, a COVID-19 outbreak occurred as the result of a choral practice at the Mount Vernon
Presbyterian Church in Skagit Valley, Washington, U.S. One symptomatic individual attended the choral
practice which included a total of 61 vocalists. After the practice, 53 members were confirmed through
testing or were strongly suspected of as having contracted COVID-19 from reported symptoms. A
detailed analysis of this likely superspreading event was previously performed,21 assuming transmission
was predominantly via virus-containing aerosols and using gathered data to infer the quanta generation
rate of aerosols emitted by the infected individual. Based on this previous analysis and data gathered to
perform it the following parameters were entered into the model.
Rehearsal hall room size: 1,937.5 ft2 (180 m2), 14.76 ft (4.5 m) ceiling.21
Design OA: 1,236 cfm (2,100 m3/hr). The referenced analysis21 used ASHRAE Standard 62.1 and existing
mechanical drawings to estimate the design ventilation, or outside air (OA), for the rehearsal hall.
Design RA: 3,473 cfm (5,900 m3/hr). The referenced analysis21 used ASHRAE Standard 62.1 and existing
mechanical drawings to estimate the design recirculated air (RA) for the rehearsal hall.
Choir practice OA: 334 cfm (567 m3/hr), +/- 50% uncertainty: 167 cfm (284 m3/hr) – 501 cfm (850
m3/hr). Based on the data gathered, the referenced analysis21 assumed the HVAC fan wasn’t operating
during the choir practice, providing no mechanical outside or recirculated air (the body heat from the
number of choir members present was sufficient to maintain a comfortable temperature). Based on the
delta between exterior and interior temperatures during the practice, the estimated body heat
generated by individual choir members, and the heat capacity of air, an estimate was made by the
referenced analysis21 of the amount of outside air that entered via infiltration, along with values
representative of +/- 50% uncertainty.
Choir practice RA: 0 cfm (0 m3/hr).21 The system was not running at the time of the event.
Furnace filter: MERV 11.21
Temperature: Thermostat setting: 68 OF (20 OC), assumed interior temperature: 71 OF (22 OC),
determined from gathered data.21 The interior temperature fits within the 68OF - 76OF (20OC - 24.4OC)
that this model is currently optimized for.
Relative humidity (RH): 30% RH. No RH information for the rehearsal hall room during the practice was
provided.21 Nor was the use of any type of humidifier indicated. As the heater had been on to warm the
space before choir members arrived, the air was assumed to be at a lower humidity than if the heater
had not been running. Deviations from this estimation are discussed below.
Number of infected individuals: 1. The referenced analysis21 made this estimation based on one choir
member having “cold-like” symptoms manifesting three days prior to the practice and subsequently
testing positive for COVID-19.
Viral shedding level: High. Referencing other published analyses of COVID-19’s incubation time, the
referenced analysis21 estimates that such a high secondary attack rate resulting from one infected
person would require high shedding of the virus by the infected individual.
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Activity level: Light. Choral members were generally sitting while practicing with some limited standing
and walking.21 Holding music and singing while sitting would be more along the lines of office work as
opposed to passively sitting while resting. Therefore a “light” activity level was selected, which would
also encompass standing and leisurely walking for short distances.
Number of choral members present: 61.21 This includes the infected individual.
Expiratory Means / Exposure Time: The following breakdown was selected for this analysis. The
probability of infection was calculated for each time period and the net probability of infection
determined from these three individual values.
●
●
●

Singing / 126 minutes (2.1 hours)
Speaking / 18 minutes (0.3 hours)
Breathing Only / 6 minutes (0.1 hours)

The total rehearsal time was determined to be 2.5 hours,21 broken up as follows:
●
●

●
●

Phase 1: 45 minutes with the 61 choral members all together in the Fellowship Hall. This time
was spent primarily practicing with a brief amount of time transitioning to the next phase.
Phase 2: 45 minutes spent primarily practicing in two groups. Group 1 consisted of
approximately 35 people practicing in the Fellowship Hall and group 2 consisted of
approximately 26 people practicing in the sanctuary. The infected person was part of Group 1.
Break: 10 minutes with everyone talking and eating snacks.
Phase 3: 50 minutes with the 61 choral members practicing all together in the Fellowship Hall.

To simplify the analysis, Phase 2 was modelled as the same conditions in Phase 1. This was decided due
to a) lacking dimensional and ventilation information for the sanctuary and b) the infected person being
part of the group practicing in the Fellowship Hall. In addition, an average amount of time of singing vs
speaking vs breathing over the 2.5 hours was estimated referencing the answers provided by the choir
spokesperson.21
Table 9 provides a) the resulting probability of infections calculated using this model, given the above
estimations and b) the potential resulting number of additional people infected given the net probability
of infection. The probability of infection for the three different expiratory means / exposure times are
listed as well as the resulting net probability (the chance that at least one of these three conditions
occurs). The net probability is calculated as shown in Equation (13).
●

NPI = (PIsinging + PIspeaking + PIbreathing) − (PIsinging ∗ PIspeaking) −
(PIsinging ∗ PIbreathing) − (PIspeaking ∗ PIbreathing) + (PIsinging ∗ PIspeaking ∗
PIbreathing)
(13)
○ NPI = Net Probability of Infection
○ PIsinging = Probability of Infection - Singing
○ PIspeaking = Probability of Infection - Speaking
○ PIbreathing = Probability of Infection - Breathing

The number of additional people infected is 60 uninfected individuals multiplied by the net probability
of infection.
Table 9: Probability of infections and resulting additional choral members potentially infected.
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Choral Practice Conditions

Design OA & RA

OA - 167 cfm OA - 334 cfm OA - 501 cfm OA - 1236 cfm (2,100 m3/hr);
(284 m3/hr) (567 m3/hr) (850 m3/hr) RA - 3,473 cfm (5,900 m3/hr)
Probability of Infection - Singing

96.0%

83.8%

71.8%

16.8%

Probability of Infection - Speaking

5.5%

3.1%

2.2%

0.3%

Probability of Infection Breathing

0.5%

0.3%

0.2%

0.0%

Net Probability of Infection

96.2%

84.3%

72.5%

17.0%

Number of Additional Infected

58

51

43

10

Normalized Error

7.9%

-4.0%

-15.9%

---------

For the estimated ventilation of 334 cfm (567 m3/hr), the resulting net probability of infection was
estimated to be 84.3%, or an estimated 51 additional infected individuals. This is two less than the likely
53 additional choral members infected. Results are also provided for the +/- 50% uncertainty ventilation
rates, giving potential numbers of additional infected individuals of 58 and 43 respectively for the low
and high ventilation rates. The difference, or error, between the predicted and actual number of
additional people infected, normalized by the total number of uninfected people initially present is also
provided. This error was normalized using the total number of uninfected people initially present. In
addition, for comparison purposes, results are also provided for the design ventilation and recirculated
air rates. If the furnace had been running, providing these design rates, the model estimates a net
probability of infection of only 17%, or 10 additional people potentially infected.
The results provided in Table 9 are based on a RH of 30%, though it’s possible the RH varied from this
depending on how much the furnace dried the air out prior to the practice and how rapidly the RH
subsequently increased after the furnace was shut off. To account for this, Figure 1 shows the potential
number of additional people infected for 20% RH, 30% RH, and 40% RH.
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Figure 1: The potential number of additional people infected depending on ventilation and RH.
Depending on the actual choir practice ventilation rate and interior RH (ranging from 20% to 40%), the
model’s normalized error output ranges in underestimating the probability of infection and resulting
number of people potentially infected by 18.4% to overestimating them by 9.7%. If we assume that 334
cfm (567 m3/hr) is very close to the actual choir practice ventilation rate, then the model’s normalized
error output ranges in underestimating these values from 6.9% to 1.3%. So overall:
●
●

Normalized error range for all ventilation rates: -18.4% to 9.7%
Normalized error range for 334 cfm (567 m3/hr) outside air: -6.9% to -1.3%

Guangzhou restaurant event
On January 24, 2020, a spreading event is thought to have occurred at an unnamed restaurant in
Guangzhou, China.87,88 It occurred on the third floor of the restaurant in question, where a single index
case is thought to have infected nine additional patrons out of a total of 89 patrons present for between
53 and 75 minutes. Masks were not worn. Based on the associated epidemiological data, data gathered
on the restaurant and its operations, as well as an analysis involving tracer gas and computer simulation,
the following parameters were entered into the model.
Dining room size: The estimated area and ceiling heights are taken directly from the referenced
analyses.87,88 Scenario 1 examines the whole third floor dining area. Scenario 2 only looks at the air
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conditioning zone within which the infections occurred. No patrons outside of this particular zone ended
up being infected. Within the dining room there are five ceiling mounted fan-coil air conditioning units
located along one of the long walls, each serving a separate “zone” within the room, with its own supply
and return at the unit. While there are no physical barriers between the zones to prevent air mixing
across the zones, the air flow from the supply out across the width of the room and then back to the
return does limit some of the mixing. In addition, the zone in which the infections occurred was also at
the far end of the room, further isolating it from the other zones. As this model assumes droplets /
aerosols are instantaneously, continuously, and evenly distributed throughout the room upon
expiration, applying it to the whole dining space may be too great a simplification to accurately predict
the probability of infection given the limitations on air mixing between the zones. Therefore, an analysis
is also run on the one zone only where the infections occurred. This results in the two scenarios being
analysed.
●
●

Scenario 1: 1,482.2 ft2 (137.7 m2), 10.3 ft (3.14 m) ceiling.
Scenario 2: 193.8 ft2 (18 m2), 10.3 ft (3.14 m) ceiling.

Ventilation OA: Ventilation in the space was apparently limited to brief, infrequent openings of the fire
door and infiltration due to negative air pressure created by the restroom exhaust fan running.88 While
the dining space had wall mounted exhaust fans to promote ventilation they were turned off during the
period in question. And the five fan-coil air conditioning units serving the dining space did not supply
outdoor air - they are recirculating only units. Based on the tracer gas analysis,88 the air changes per
hour (ACH) during the period in question was estimated to be between 0.56 and 0.77. These values
along with the volume of the dining space for each scenario were used to determine the following cfm
ranges.
●
●

Scenario 1: 142 cfm (242 m3/hr) - 196 cfm (333 m3/hr)
Scenario 2: 18.6 cfm (31.7 m3/hr) - 25.6 cfm (43.5 m3/hr)

Recirculated air (RA): Unfortunately, no detailed information on the fan-coil air conditioning units was
provided. Based on the image in a letter response from one of the analyses,89 these appear to be
cassette fan-coil units in a chilled water DX split system. To estimate the recirculated air supplied by
each unit, a design ventilation rate was first estimated using ASHRAE 62.1. Based on the square footage
of the dining space, this rate is determined to be 1,045 cfm (1,776 m3/hr) for the whole dining area. A
rough rule of thumb is that ventilation air is 20% of the total supply air. As the recirculated air is total
supply air minus ventilation air, RA is then estimated at 4,180 cfm (7,102 m3/hr) using this rule of thumb.
The ESACIR horizontal concealed ceiling exposed cassette chilled water fan coil unit, by Shenzhen
Eurostars Technology Co., Ltd.,90 is likely similar to the fan coil unit depicted in the image referenced
above.89 From the drawings/plans in one of the referenced analyses,88 there may have been two
different sizes of units. Using the listed high air flow ratings for a 2-pipe system, (3) of the 1000HC2 units
(1,000 cfm / 1,700 m3/hr) and (2) of the 600HC2 units (600 cfm / 1,020 m3/hr) would satisfy the RA
calculated above. As the speed these units were likely running at was not reported, the medium
speed/airflow setting was decided for this analysis. And per the above drawings/plans, the air-flow zone
where the infections occurred was served by one of the larger units. Therefore, the RA is estimated to
be as follows for each scenario:
●

Scenario 1: 3,161 cfm (5,370 m3/hr)
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●

Scenario 2: 753 cfm (1,280 m3/hr)

Fan coil unit filter: MERV 4 for both scenarios. For the ESACIR unit mentioned above, a washable filter is
listed as optional. Such filters typically have a MERV rating of 1 to 4. Other similar cassette fan coil units
may accept disposable filters ranging in MERV ratings from 1 to 13, though ratings above 4 typically
require the addition of a filter box. It doesn’t appear in the image89 referenced above that a filter box is
included with the unit, so it is unlikely a filter with a MERV rating greater than 4 was present. As a result
of field measurements and computer simulations, the study88 reported a filtration efficiency of 20% for
an aerosol diameter of 5 μm, which would suggest the presence of a MERV 4 or equivalent filter.9,8 Each
scenario is therefore run using a MERV 4 filter.
Temperature: No information was given on the interior temperature in any of the referenced analyses.
87,88,89
The interior temperature was assumed within the 68OF - 76OF (20OC - 24.4OC) that this model is
currently optimized for.
Relative humidity (RH): 40% RH for both scenarios. No information was given on the RH in any of the
referenced analyses.,87,88,89 As the air conditioning fan coil units were running with very little outside air
provided, the RH humidity was assumed to have been lower than the exterior average 72% RH for this
time of year in Guangzhou, somewhere between 30% and 50%. While the analysis could have been run
for 30%, 40%, and 50%, based on the limited impact of RH within a similar range on the previous Skagit
Valley chorale superspreading event analysis, it was decided to focus only on 40% RH to simplify the
analysis.
Number of infected individuals: One for both scenarios. As reported in the referenced analyses, 87,88 one
infected individual sitting at the middle table of the air-flow zone in which all of the infections occurred
served as the infected person.
Viral shedding level: High for both scenarios. This person was reported to have developed symptoms
later that day, so this person appears to have been pre-symptomatic while dining in the restaurant. It
has been reported that patients may be most infectious in the initial period after infection, before or
shortly after symptoms emerge.91,92,93 For these reasons, the authors of the study88 estimated that the
index case had a “relative large quanta generation rate” while dining. This study followed their lead and
used the high shedder condition for the index case.
Activity level: Light. Sitting while talking and eating would be more along the lines of office work as
opposed to passively sitting while resting. Therefore a “light” activity level was selected.
Number of patrons present: For the purposes of this analysis, waiters and other restaurant staff are
excluded from the analysis, as they were not consistently present within the dining area. The study88
reported 89 patrons were present during the time in question, and that 21 patrons sat within the airflow
zone in which the infections occurred. In addition, nine patrons were infected as a result of this incident,
all sitting at the tables encompassed within Scenario 2. No indication of adults versus children among
the patrons was provided so it is assumed these are all adults. Therefore, the number of patrons for
each scenario consists as follows:
●

Scenario 1: 89 patrons, including the single infected person and the nine additional infected
individuals.
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●

Scenario 2: 21 patrons, including the single infected person and the nine additional infected
individuals.

Expiratory means / exposure time: The following breakdown was selected for this analysis. The
probability of infection was calculated for each time period and the net probability of infection
determined from these three individual values.
●
●
●

Speaking Loudly: 6 minutes (0.1 hours)
Speaking: 24 minutes (0.4 hours)
Breathing (Listening/Eating/Drinking): 36 minutes (0.6 hours)

The time of exposure reported in the referenced analyses,87,88 was only for the three tables located in
the airflow zone in which the infections occurred. Three families occupied these three tables at the
following times - Table A: 12:01 - 13:23, Table B: 11:37 - 12:54, and Table C: 12:03 - 13:18. The infected
person sat at Table A, overlapping with Table B by 53 minutes and with Table C by 75 minutes. Averaging
the (2) times together results in 64 minutes, which is rounded up to 66 minutes to equate to an even 1.1
hours of exposure time. The amount of time Table A overlapped with the remaining 68 patrons is
unknown, so 1.1 hours is used as an approximation.
Little information in the referenced analyses87,88 is provided on the expiratory means, and these patrons
were assumed to have spent their time in the restaurant breathing, eating/drinking, speaking, and
potentially speaking loudly. For the purposes of this analysis, breathing is assumed to expel a similar
quantity and size distribution of virus-containing aerosols as eating/drinking, though this may
underestimate the amount produced. Little research in general appears to exist quantifying the amount
of a group mealtime spent eating/drinking vs speaking vs listening/breathing.
For the 66 minutes, it is assumed that 24 minutes are spent speaking/listening and waiting for the food
to be served, 30 minutes are spent eating/drinking and speaking/listening, and 12 minutes are spent
speaking/listening after eating (see Figure 2). For the combined 36 minutes spent just speaking and
listening/breathing, it is assumed that 18 minutes are spent speaking and 18 minutes are spent
listening/breathing. And 6 of the 18 minutes is assumed to be spent speaking more loudly. For the 30
minutes spent eating/drinking and speaking/listening, it is assumed that 18 minutes are spent
eating/drinking/breathing and listening/breathing and 12 minutes spent speaking.
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Figure 2: Expiratory means / exposure time (in minutes) estimations for the Guangzhou restaurant event
analysis
Table 10 provides a) the resulting probability of infections and b) the potential number of additional
people infected given the net probability of infection. The probability of infection for the three different
expiratory means / exposure times are listed as well as the resulting net probability (the chance that at
least one of these three conditions occurs). The number of additional people infected is the net
probability of infection multiplied by 88 uninfected individuals (for scenario 1) and 20 uninfected
individuals (for scenario 2).
Table 10: Probability of infections and resulting additional patrons potentially infected
Scenario
Ventilation

MERV Filter Level
Virus Shedding Level
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Scenario 1 - Whole Restaurant

Scenario 2 - Airflow Zone of Infection

142 cfm (242
m3/hr)

196 cfm (333
m3/hr)

18.6 cfm (31.7
m3/hr)

25.6 cfm (43.5
m3/hr)

4

4

4

4

High

High

High

High

Probability of Infection Speaking Loudly

6.0%

5.4%

26.4%

25.0%

Probability of Infection Speaking

2.9%

2.7%

13.7%

13.0%

Probability of Infection Breathing

1.2%

1.1%

5.9%

5.6%

9.8%

9.0%

40.2%

38.4%

9

8

8

8

-0.4%

-1.3%

-4.8%

-6.6%

Net Probability of Infection
Number of Additional Infected
Normalized Error: 9 More Infected

If the estimations are generally correct, then for scenario 1 the model’s normalized error output ranges
from -1.3% to -0.4%, underestimating the number of resulting people infected by one or accurately
estimating it, depending on the ventilation rates, given the total number of uninfected patrons present
in the room. For scenario 2 the model’s normalized error output ranges from -6.6% to -4.8%
underestimating the number of additional people by one for both ventilation rates, given the total
number of uninfected patrons present in this zone. So overall:
●
●

Scenario 1 Normalized Error Range: -1.3% to -0.4%
Scenario 2 Normalized Error Range: -6.6% to -4.8%

Interestingly, the model’s estimated number of people potentially infected was close to the actual
number of patrons infected for both scenarios. As discussed above, the air circulation created by each
fan coil unit limited the flow of aerosols across airflow zones, contributing to the resulting additional
infections only occurring within the single airflow zone with the index case. That would suggest this
model, which assumes aerosols are instantaneously, continuously, and evenly distributed throughout
the space being analysed, should be better aligned with scenario 2 than scenario 1. The probability of
infections for scenario 2 should better reflect the actual conditions for that airflow zone than the
probability of infections for scenario 1 reflect the actual conditions for the entire space.
If this is the case, the fact that the model’s analysis of scenario 1 produced results closely aligned with
the actual range of additional individuals infected is likely a coincidence partially driven by the number
of patrons present in this case study. For example, instead of 20 uninfected patrons in scenario 2,
assume nine uninfected patrons were actually present. Then the resulting potential number of
additional patrons infected would be three at 25.6 cfm (43.5 m3/hr) of ventilation. For scenario 1, using
77 uninfected patrons for the whole dining space (11 subtracted from 88), the resulting potential
number of additional people infected would be seven at 196 cfm (333 m3/hr) of ventilation. In this case
there is a greater difference between the two scenarios, and scenario 2 likely represents the more
accurate assessment of the model’s capabilities.
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Limitations
There are a number of limitations associated with the model itself, as well as the efforts to validate it.
Looking specifically at the model’s major limitations, it estimates the probability of infection from
airborne transmission only, excluding other routes of transmission such as fomite and direct contact. In
addition, the model assumes that the virus-containing aerosols are evenly distributed throughout the
space immediately after leaving an infected individual and that the room is a well-mixed condition, with
the resulting probability of infection representing an average across the room or space being analysed. It
is therefore most applicable for assessing the risk from far-field virus-containing aerosols; it
underestimates the risk from near-field virus-containing aerosols that occur at a greater density than the
far-field aerosols.
In addition, the quantum generation rates are estimates for many of the listed activity levels and degree
of shedding, particularly relative to SARS-CoV-2. As more research is conducted, these values will need
to be updated based on what is learned. In addition, due to conflicting data and opinions in the research
relative to varying quantum generation rates between adults and children,11,12 the model currently
assumes the same rate for both children and adults.
While the model provides the ability to account for more than one infected individual, it does not allow
the user to vary the expiratory means, activity level, quantum of infection, pulmonary ventilation rate,
or child versus adult among the infected individuals. The same is generally true for the susceptible
individuals, with a few exceptions focused on age.
The model does allow one to differentiate between children and adults for the susceptible individuals,
but this distinction is limited to two categories: those less than 18 years of age and those 18 and over.
Further variation relative to such factors as pulmonary ventilation (breathing), vaccination rates, etc. are
found within each of these two broad categories that are currently not accounted for.
The model does not currently allow one to modify temperature, and it is optimized for interior
temperatures between 68OF - 76OF (20OC - 24.4OC). Applying it to other temperature conditions will
decrease the model’s accuracy. Future versions will look at incorporating the ability to modify
temperature. Mask selections are also limited to the 13 types listed in Table 5.
It may be necessary to consult with various experts, such as consulting engineers, commissioning agents,
TAB consultants, and/or manufacturers, to verify the most appropriate values to use for such inputs as
ventilation rate, recirculated air rate, filter rating, the portable air cleaner’s CADR rating, RH, and the
upper room UVGI system’s upper zone average irradiance or fluency value.
In addition to hinging on using the most appropriate value for the upper room UVGI system’s upper
zone average irradiance or fluency, the associated upper room UVGI system removal factor calculation is
also dependent on the actual room conditions being well-mixed. Conditions of stagnation or high ACH
will decrease the accuracy of the results. Future versions will look at improving the incorporation of the
impacts of air flow. And at this point there are no known studies linking the susceptibility parameter (Z)
for SARS-CoV-2 to RH. As future research illuminates this relationship, the model will need to be
updated accordingly.
Vaccine efficacy relative to preventing COVID-19 is still being assessed and the associated adjusted
vaccination factor will need to be updated as our understanding of efficacy improves. Nor does the
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model account for any immunity generated through previous community infections. In those cases
where a large number of such individuals (who are also unvaccinated) may be present within a building
population, the results will overestimate the probability of infection to an unknown degree.
Despite these limitations, we have found the model quite useful in evaluating the relative impacts that
different mitigation strategies included in the model have on reducing the risk of infection from SARSCoV-2 and influenza via an airborne transmission route.
Turning to the validation exercises, in general there are a limited number of documented real-world
events, or even controlled laboratory experiments, available for use to validate the model. For those
that do exist, many of the parameters needed for the inputs of the model have not been recorded and
are difficult to estimate (if estimating can be done at all). The studies for the two events selected have
either verified or estimated most of the necessary inputs for this model and appear to have provided the
best opportunity to validate the model using actual events. That being said, each event comes with its
own set of limitations discussed below.

Skagit Valley choral superspreading event
The only estimation made that was not justified by information given in the referenced study21 itself was
the 30% input value used for RH. As discussed above, the study did not provide any estimate of the
rehearsal hall room’s RH during the event. As the heater had been running immediately prior to the
choral practice, the interior humidity was estimated to be lower than 50% and the analysis was run for
values of 20% RH, 30% RH, and 40% RH. Note that the results do not vary significantly between these
three RH percentages.
The expiratory means / exposure time input values were based directly on the information provided in
the study and are discussed in detail above. However, the simplification made with respect to treating
the phase 2 portion of the practice similar to the phase 1 portion could have some minimal impact on
the results. This and the uncertainty regarding RH are the two weakest links in this analysis. The
measurements and estimates made for the rehearsal hall room size, choir practice OA and RA, the
interior temperature, number of infected individuals, viral shedding level, activity level, number of
choral members present, and the number of resulting choral members infected are discussed in detail in
the referenced study. These estimates have generally been well justified by the authors of this study.

Guangzhou restaurant event
Estimates had to be made for recirculated air, temperature, and RH with little justification given by the
information in the referenced analyses.87,88,89 The justification for recirculated air and RH were provided
in detail above. There is little justification available for the assumption that the temperature fell within
the range optimized for this model. It, along with assigning exposure times to specific expiratory means
discussed below, represent the weakest links relative to justifications.
The expiratory means / exposure time input values were based directly on the information provided in
the referenced analyses and are discussed in detail above. However, there was little to go on to assign
specific exposure times to each expiratory method, relying primarily on the authors’ own experiences. If
actual times varied significantly from what was assumed, it could have a noticeable impact on the
results. The measurements and estimates made for the dining room size, ventilation OA, fan coil unit
filter, number of infected individuals, viral shedding level, activity level, number of patrons present, and
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resulting number of patrons infected are discussed in detail in the referenced analyses. And these
estimates have been well justified by the authors of these analyses.
One of the largest questions posed by running an analysis of the Guangzhou restaurant event relative to
the model’s assumptions was whether to focus on the entire third floor dining area or only on the single
airflow zone with the index case. The latter was likely a closer approximation to a well-mixed
environment than the former, and the results of the analysis appeared to support the notion that model
applications suffer if the actual environment deviates significantly from well-mixed conditions.
While there are limitations relative to the certainty of some of the inputs for these two events, in the
authors’ opinions, they nevertheless validate the generally applicability of the model if its major
assumptions are closely met. However, there are several other aspects of the model that still require
testing if appropriate documented real-world events or controlled laboratory experiments are found.
These include validating the model’s treatment of portable air cleaners, upper room UVGI systems,
mask wearing, vaccination, children, and the quanta estimates for influenza.

Conclusion
At the beginning of the pandemic in early 2020, there was an expressed need from various building
owners, facility managers, occupants, and AEC industry consultants to help evaluate the relative
contribution of different interior COVID-19 risk mitigation strategies. There was a lack of easily
accessible tools and other resources for comparing and ranking different solutions (e.g., increased
ventilation, filtration, mask wearing, de-densifying, UV technologies, etc.) for a given context based on
both removal efficiency and the probability of infection. This web application1 and its underlying model
were developed specifically to contextually compare and rank available influenza and SARS-CoV-2
mitigation strategies for making our built environments safer.
In this paper, the authors have provided a detailed overview of the underlying model’s removal and
inactivation mechanisms and its specific model of infection, including required inputs, associated
assumptions and their justifications as well as the associated limitations. The model was also validated
against two documented spreading events to assess its effectiveness, with the normalized errors for
both analyses as follows:
●
●
●

Skagit Valley Chorale Normalized Error Range for all Ventilation Rates: -18.4% to +9.7%
Skagit Valley Chorale Normalized Error Range for 334 cfm (567 m3/hr) Outside Air: -6.9% to 1.3%
Guangzhou Restaurant Normalized Error Range for Scenario 2: -6.6% to -4.8%

For conditions that generally meet the constraints of the model, these two analyses suggest that the
error between modelled and actual number of additional people infected, normalized by the number of
uninfected people present, will range from roughly -18.4% to +9.7%. The more certain one can be
regarding the input parameters (such as ventilation rates), the smaller these normalized errors will likely
be, potentially under 2% as indicated in looking at the range above for the most likely Skagit Valley
ventilation rate of 334 cfm (567 m3/hr). In addition, the farther actual conditions vary from a box
configuration, from an instantaneous, continuous, and even distribution of aerosols, and/or from a
temperature range of 68OF - 76OF (20OC - 24.4OC), the less applicable this model will be to analysing
those conditions.
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This suggests the model is appropriate to use when its limitations are adequately accounted for and
input parameters can be accurately determined. Design team members, commissioning agents, building
owners, or facility managers attempting to use this tool to assess existing buildings or new designs have
a much larger potential to accurately verify input parameters compared to modelling past events, some
of which occurred in other countries. The results of such analyses are then more likely to have less
errors than the results presented here.
But additional validation of the Facility Infection Risk Estimator™1 and its underlying model against
events including other parameters would be useful. Events involving children or children and adults,
varying degrees of mask wearing, activity levels other than light, portable filter units, upper room UVGI
systems, and influenza instead of SARS-CoV-2 would provide further useful validation. In addition to
looking for other events to analyse, the model could also be validated against the monitored
effectiveness of mitigation strategies that have been implemented. Opportunities for further
development of the model include parameters for SARS-CoV-2 variants, updated data on COVID-19
vaccinations, updated research on masks, updated research on SARS-CoV-2 quanta generation rates, as
well as similar updated data/research on influenza.

Authors' contributions
Dr. Marcel Harmon was primarily responsible for the development and implementation of the Facility
Infection Risk Estimator™. Dr. Josephine Lau provided reviews, comments, and suggestions for earlier
versions of the web application tool and underlying model. Dr. Harmon wrote the paper with Dr. Lau.

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the devotion of resources and time for the development of this
freely accessible web application tool by Branchpattern. This includes the time and expertise of several
BranchPattern employees to review, beta test, and help implement, including Principals Rick Maniktala
and Pete Jefferson, Associate Principal Stuart Shell, and Senior Associate Dannie DiIonno. Stuart Shell
also provided reviews of the paper.

Declaration of conflicting interests
Dr. Josephine Lau was paid a small fee by BranchPattern, the firm employing Dr. Marcel Harmon and the
owner of the Facility Infection Risk Estimator™, to review and comment on an earlier version of the web
application tool. Dr. Lau is also a member of this journal’s editorial board but was not involved in the
review or decision-making process on the journal’s side. The authors declare no other potential conflicts
of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

References
1.

BranchPattern. Facility Infection Risk Estimator v2.1,
https://branchpattern.com/research/facility-infection-risk-estimator/ (2020, accessed 22 March
2021).

2.

Greenhalgh T, Jimenez JL, Prather KA, Tufekci Z, Fisman D, Schooley R. Ten scientific reasons in
support of airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Lancet 2021; 397: 1603–1605.

29 | P a g e

3.

Yang W, Elankumaran S, Marr LC. Concentrations and size distributions of airborne influenza A
viruses measured indoors at a health centre, a day-care centre and on aeroplanes. J R Soc
Interface 2011; 8: 1176–1184.

4.

Smieszek T, Lazzari G, Salathé M. Assessing the Dynamics and Control of Droplet- and AerosolTransmitted Influenza Using an Indoor Positioning System. Sci Rep 2019; 9: 2185.

5.

Ladhani L, Pardon G, Meeuws H, van Wesenbeeck L, Schmidt K, Stuyver L, van der Wijngaart W.
Sampling and detection of airborne influenza virus towards point-of-care applications. PLoS One
2017; 12: e0174314.

6.

Randall K, Ewing ET, Marr L, Jimenez J, Bourouiba L. How Did We Get Here: What Are Droplets
and Aerosols and How Far Do They Go? A Historical Perspective on the Transmission of
Respiratory Infectious Diseases, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3829873 (2021, accessed 1
June 2021).

7.

Allen JG, Ibrahim AM. Indoor Air Changes and Potential Implications for SARS-CoV-2
Transmission. JAMA 2021; 325: 2112–2113.

8.

Azimi P, Stephens B. HVAC filtration for controlling infectious airborne disease transmission in
indoor environments: Predicting risk reductions and operational costs. Build Environ 2013; 70:
150–160.

9.

Stephens B. Wells-Riley & HVAC Filtration for infectious airborne aerosols NAFA Foundation
Report HVAC filtration and the Wells-Riley approach to assessing risks of infectious airborne
diseases Final Report Prepared for: The National Air Filtration Association (NAFA). Virginia Beach,
VA, www.built-envi.com (2012, accessed 10 March 2021).

10.

Mikszewski A, Buonanno G, Stabile L, Pacitto A. Airborne Infection Risk Calculator User’s Manual,
https://cires.colorado.edu/news/covid-19-airborne-transmission-tool-available (2020, accessed 9
March 2021).

11.

Chen SC, Liao C-M. Modelling control measures to reduce the impact of pandemic influenza
among schoolchildren. Epidemiol Infect 2008; 136: 1035–1045.

12.

Jimenez JL. 2020_COVID-19_Aerosol_Transmission_Estimator - Google Sheets, v. 3.4.22,
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/16K1OQkLD4BjgBdO8ePj6ytfRpPMlJ6aXFg3PrIQBbQ/edit#gid=519189277 (2020, accessed 9 March 2021).

13.

Rudnick SN, Milton DK. Risk of indoor airborne infection transmission estimated from carbon
dioxide concentration. Indoor Air 2003; 13: 237–245.

14.

Fabian MP, McDevitt JJ, DeHaan WH, Fung ROP, Cowling BJ, Chan K-H, Leung GM, Milton DK.
Influenza Virus in Human Exhaled Breath: An Observational Study. PLoS One 2008; 3: e2691.

15.

Zemouri C, Awad SF, Volgenant CMC, Crielaard W, Laheij AMGA, de Soet JJ. Modeling of the
Transmission of Coronaviruses, Measles Virus, Influenza Virus, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and
Legionella pneumophila in Dental Clinics. J Dent Res 2020; 99: 1192–1198.

30 | P a g e

16.

Beggs CB, Avital EJ. Upper-room ultraviolet air disinfection might help to reduce COVID-19
transmission in buildings. medRxiv 2020; 2020.06.12.20129254.

17.

Bueno de Mesquita PJ, Noakes CJ, Milton DK. Quantitative aerobiologic analysis of an influenza
human challenge-transmission trial. Indoor Air 2020; 30: 1189–1198.

18.

Liao C-M, Chen SC, Chang CF. Modelling respiratory infection control measure effects. Epidemiol
Infect 2008; 136: 299–308.

19.

Buonanno G, Morawska L, Stabile L. Quantitative assessment of the risk of airborne transmission
of SARS-CoV-2 infection: Prospective and retrospective applications. Environ Int 2020; 145:
106112.

20.

Buonanno G, Stabile L, Morawska L. Estimation of airborne viral emission: Quanta emission rate
of SARS-CoV-2 for infection risk assessment. Environ Int 2020; 141: 105794.

21.

Miller SL, Nazaroff WW, Jimenez JL, Boerstra A, Buonanno G, Dancer SJ, Kurnitski J, Marr L,
Morawska L, Noakes CJ. Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 by inhalation of respiratory aerosol in the
Skagit Valley Chorale superspreading event. medRxiv 2020; 2020.06.15.20132027.

22.

Dai H, Zhao B. Association of infected probability of COVID-19 with ventilation rates in confined
spaces: a Wells-Riley equation based investigation. medRxiv 2020; 2020.04.21.20072397.

23.

U.S. EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). Exposure Factors Handbook 2011 Edition (Final
Report). Washington, DC, https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/risk/recordisplay.cfm?deid=236252 (2011,
accessed 10 March 2021).

24.

Gammaitoni L, Nucci MC. Using a mathematical model to evaluate the efficacy of TB control
measures. Emerg Infect Dis 1997; 3: 335–342.

25.

Marr LC, Tang JW, Van Mullekom J, Lakdawala, SS. Mechanistic insights into the effect of
humidity on airborne influenza virus survival, transmission and incidence. J R Soc Interface 2019;
16: 20180298.

26.

de Oliveira PM, Mesquita LCC, Gkantonas S, Giusti A, Mastorakos E. Evolution of spray and
aerosol from respiratory releases: theoretical estimates for insight on viral transmission. medRxiv
2020; 2020.07.23.20160648.

27.

Yang W, Marr LC. Mechanisms by which ambient humidity may affect viruses in aerosols. Appl
Environ Microbiol 2012; 78: 6781–6788.

28.

Evans P. Properties of Air at atmospheric pressure. The Engineering Mindset.com,
https://theengineeringmindset.com/properties-of-air-at-atmospheric-pressure/ (2015, accessed
10 March 2021).

29.

Fabian MP, Brain J, Houseman EA, Gern J, Milton DK. Origin of exhaled breath particles from
healthy and human rhinovirus-infected subjects. J Aerosol Med Pulm Drug Deliv 2011; 24: 137–
147.

31 | P a g e

30.

Milton DK, Fabian MP, Cowling BJ, Grantham ML, McDevitt JJ. Influenza Virus Aerosols in Human
Exhaled Breath: Particle Size, Culturability, and Effect of Surgical Masks. PLOS Pathog 2013; 9:
e1003205.

31.

Morawska L, Johnson GR, Ristovski ZD, Hargreaves M, Mengersen K, Corbett S, Chao CYH, Li Y,
Katoshevski, D. Size distribution and sites of origin of droplets expelled from the human
respiratory tract during expiratory activities. J Aerosol Sci 2009; 40: 256–269.

32.

Gregson FKA, Watson NA, Orton CM, Haddrell AE, McCarthy LP, Finnie TJR, Gent N, Donaldson,
GC, Shah PL, Calder JD, Bzdek BR, Costello D, Reid JP. Comparing the Respirable Aerosol
Concentrations and Particle Size Distributions Generated by Singing, Speaking and Breathing.
ChemRxiv; 1. Epub ahead of print 20 August 2020. DOI: 10.26434/chemrxiv.12789221.v1.

33.

Johnson GR, Morawska L, Ristovski ZD, Hargreaves M, Mengersen K, Chao CYH, Wan MP, Li Y, Xie
X, Katoshevski D, Corbett S. Modality of human expired aerosol size distributions. J Aerosol Sci
2011; 42: 839–851.

34.

Lindsley WG, Blachere FM, Thewlis RE, Vishnu A, Davis KA, Cao G, Palmer JE, Clark KE, Fisher MA,
Khakoo R, Beezhold DH. Measurements of Airborne Influenza Virus in Aerosol Particles from
Human Coughs. PLoS One 2010; 5: e15100.

35.

Lindsley WG, Blachere FM, Beezhold DH, Thewlis RE, Noorbakhsh B, Othumpangat S, Goldsmith
WT, McMillen CM, Andrew ME, Burrell CN, Noti, JD. Viable influenza A virus in airborne particles
expelled during coughs versus exhalations. Influenza Other Respi Viruses 2016; 10: 404–413.

36.

Han ZY, Weng WG, Huang QY. Characterizations of particle size distribution of the droplets
exhaled by sneeze. J R Soc Interface 2013; 10: 20130560.

37.

Duguid JP. The size and the duration of air-carriage of respiratory droplets and droplet-nuclei. J
Hyg (Lond) 1946; 44: 471–479.

38.

Yang W, Marr LC. Dynamics of Airborne Influenza A Viruses Indoors and Dependence on
Humidity. PLoS One 2011; 6: e21481.

39.

Chia PY, Coleman KK, Tan YK, Milton DK, Gray GC, Schuster S, Barkham T, De PP, Vasoo S, Chan
M, Ang BSP, Tan BH, Leo Y-S, Ng O-T, Wong MSY, Marimuthu K, Lye DC, Lim PL, Lee CC, Ling LM,
Lee L, Lee TH, Wong CS, Sadarangani S, Lin RJ, Ng DHL, Sadasiv M, Yeo TW, Choy CY, Tan GSE,
Dimatatac F, Santos IF, Go CJ, Chan YK, Tay JY, Tan JY-L, Pandit N, Ho BCH, Mendis S, Chen YYC,
Abdad MY, Moses D. Detection of air and surface contamination by SARS-CoV-2 in hospital rooms
of infected patients. Nat Commun 2020; 11: 2800.

40.

Fennelly KP. Particle sizes of infectious aerosols: implications for infection control. Lancet Respir
Med 2020; 8: 914–924.

41.

Santarpia JL, Rivera DN, Herrera VL, Morwitzer MJ, Creager HM, Santarpia, GW, Crown KK, BrettMajor DM, Schnaubelt ER, Broadhurst MJ, Lawler JV, Reid SP, Lowe JJ. Aerosol and Surface
Transmission Potential of SARS-CoV-2. medRxiv 2020; 2020.03.23.20039446.

42.

Sharp DG, Taylor AR, McLean Jr. IW, Beard D, Beard JW. Densities and sizes of the Influenza

32 | P a g e

viruses A (PR8 strain) and B (Lee strain) and the Swine Influenza virus. J Biol Chem 1945; 159: 29–
44.
43.

Stewart EJ, Mead K, Olmsted RN, Pantelic J, Schoen LJ, Sekhar C, Vernon W, Li Y, Sultan ZM,
Conian W. ASHRAE Position Document on Infectious Aerosols, www.ashrae.org (2020, accessed 8
March 2021).

44.

Dietz L, Horve PF, Coil DA, Fretz M, Eisen JA, Van Den Wymelenberg K. 2019 Novel Coronavirus
(COVID-19) Pandemic: Built Environment Considerations To Reduce Transmission. mSystems
2020; 5: e00245-20.

45.

Wargocki P, Kuehn TH, Burroughs HEB, Muller CO, Conrad EA, Saputa, DA, Fisk WJ, Siegel JA,
Jackson MC, Veeck A, Francisco P. ASHRAE Position Document on Filtration and Air Cleaning,
www.ashrae.org (2015, accessed 8 March 2021).

46.

Morawska L, Tang JW, Bahnfleth WP, Bluyssen PM, Boerstra A, Buonanno G, Cao J, Dancer SJ,
Floto A, Franchimon F, Haworth C, Hogeling J, Isaxon C, Jimenez JL, Kurnitski J, Li Y, Loomans M,
Marks Guy, Marr LC, Mazzarella L, Melikov AK, Miller SL, Milton DK, Nazaroff WW, Nielsen PV,
Noakes CJ, Peccia J, Querol X, Sekhar C, Seppänen O, Tanabe S, Tellier R, Tham KW, Wargocki P,
Wierzbicka A, Yao M. How can airborne transmission of COVID-19 indoors be minimised? Environ
Int 2020; 142: 105832.

47.

Zhang J. Integrating IAQ control strategies to reduce the risk of asymptomatic SARS CoV-2
infections in classrooms and open plan offices. Sci Technol Built Environ 2020; 26: 1013–1018.

48.

Milton DK, Fabian MP, Cowling BJ, Grantham ML, McDevitt JJ. Influenza Virus Aerosols in Human
Exhaled Breath: Particle Size, Culturability, and Effect of Surgical Masks. PLOS Pathog 2013; 9:
e1003205.

49.

Lee J, Yoo D, Ryu S, Ham S, Lee K, Yeo M, Min K, Yoon C. Quantity, Size Distribution, and
Characteristics of Cough-generated Aerosol Produced by Patients with an Upper Respiratory
Tract Infection. Aerosol Air Qual Res 2019; 19: 840–853.

50.

Yan J, Grantham ML, Pantelic J, Bueno de Mesquita PJ, Albert B, Liu F, Ehrman S, Milton DK.
Infectious virus in exhaled breath of symptomatic seasonal influenza cases from a college
community. Proc Natl Acad Sci 2018; 115: 1081 LP – 1086.

51.

Kirkman S, Zhai J, Miller SL. Effectiveness of Air Cleaners for Removal of Virus-Containing
Respiratory Droplets: Recommendations for Air Cleaner Selection for Campus Spaces,
https://shellym80304.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/air-cleaner-report.pdf (2020, accessed 9
March 2021).

52.

Xiaoping L, Jianlei N, Naiping G. Co-occupant’s exposure of expiratory droplets—Effects of mouth
coverings. HVAC&R Res 2012; 18: 575–587.

53.

Asadi S, Cappa CD, Barreda S, Wexler AS, Bouvier NM, Ristenpart WD. Efficacy of masks and face
coverings in controlling outward aerosol particle emission from expiratory activities. Sci Rep
2020; 10: 15665.

33 | P a g e

54.

Clapp PW, Sickbert-Bennett EE, Samet JM, Berntsen J, Zeman KL, Anderson DJ, Weber DJ,
Bennett WD. Evaluation of Cloth Masks and Modified Procedure Masks as Personal Protective
Equipment for the Public During the COVID-19 Pandemic. JAMA Intern Med. Epub ahead of print
10 December 2020. DOI: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2020.8168.

55.

Drewnick F, Pikmann J, Fachinger F, Moormann L, Sprang F, Borrmann S. Aerosol filtration
efficiency of household materials for homemade face masks: Influence of material properties,
particle size, particle electrical charge, face velocity, and leaks. Aerosol Sci Technol 2021; 55: 63–
79.

56.

Konda A, Prakash A, Moss GA, Schmoldt M, Grant GD, Guha S. Aerosol Filtration Efficiency of
Common Fabrics Used in Respiratory Cloth Masks. ACS Nano 2020; 14: 6339–6347.

57.

Konda A, Prakash A, Moss GA, Schmoldt M, Grant, GD, Guha S. Response to Letters to the Editor
on Aerosol Filtration Efficiency of Common Fabrics Used in Respiratory Cloth Masks: Revised and
Expanded Results. ACS Nano 2020; 14: 10764–10770.

58.

Mueller A V., Eden MJ, Oakes JM, Bellini C, Fernandez LA. Quantitative Method for Comparative
Assessment of Particle Removal Efficiency of Fabric Masks as Alternatives to Standard Surgical
Masks for PPE. Matter 2020; 3: 950–962.

59.

Ueki H, Furusawa Y, Iwatsuki-Horimoto K, Imai M, Kabata H, Nishimura H, Kawaoka Y.
Effectiveness of Face Masks in Preventing Airborne Transmission of SARS-CoV-2. mSphere 2020;
5: e00637-20.

60.

Rothamer DA, Sanders S, Reindl D, Bertram TH. Strategies to minimize SARS-CoV-2 transmission
in classroom settings: Combined impacts of ventilation and mask effective filtration efficiency.
medRxiv 2021; 2020.12.31.20249101.

61.

Yang W, Elankumaran S, Marr LC. Relationship between Humidity and Influenza A Viability in
Droplets and Implications for Influenza’s Seasonality. PLoS One 2012; 7: e46789.

62.

Lin K, Marr LC. Humidity-Dependent Decay of Viruses, but Not Bacteria, in Aerosols and Droplets
Follows Disinfection Kinetics. Environ Sci Technol 2020; 54: 1024–1032.

63.

Morris DH, Yinda KC, Gamble A, Rossine FW, Huang Q, Bushmaker T, Fischer RJ, Matson MJ,
Doremalen, N van, Vikesland PJ, Marr LC, Munster VJ.Lloyd-Smith, James O.. Mechanistic theory
predicts the effects of temperature and humidity on inactivation of SARS-CoV-2 and other
enveloped viruses. bioRxiv 2020; 2020.10.16.341883.

64.

DHS (Department of Homeland Security). Estimated Airborne Decay of SARS-CoV-2,
https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/sars-airborne-calculator (accessed 8 March 2021).

65.

Cabaj A, Jalnik K, Kohmoto K, Levin RE, Nardell EA, Riley RL, van den Beld GJ, Vincent RL.
Ultraviolet Air Disinfection | CIE, http://cie.co.at/publications/ultraviolet-air-disinfection (2003,
accessed 8 March 2021).

66.

First MW, Nardell EA, Chaisson W, Riley R. Guidelines for the application of upper-room
ultraviolet germicidal irradiation for preventing transmission of airborne contagion -- Part 1:

34 | P a g e

Basic principles. United States: American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning
Engineers, Inc., Atlanta, GA (US), https://www.osti.gov/biblio/20002362 (1999).
67.

Miller SL, Hernandez M, Fennelly KP, Martyny J, Macher J, Kujundzic E, Xu P, Fabian MP, Peccia J,
Howard C. Efficacy of ultraviolet irradiation in controlling the spread of tuberculosis. Washington,
DC, https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/nioshtic-2/20022472.html (2002, accessed 9 March 2021).

68.

First MW, Nardell EA, Chaisson W, Riley R. Guidelines for the application of upper-room
ultraviolet germicidal irradiation for preventing transmission of airborne contagion -- Part 2:
Design and operation guidance. United States: American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and
Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc., Atlanta, GA (US), https://www.osti.gov/biblio/20002363 (1999).

69.

Noakes CJ, Beggs CB, Sleigh A. Modelling the Performance of Upper Room Ultraviolet Germicidal
Irradiation Devices in Ventilated Rooms: Comparison of Analytical and CFD Methods. Indoor Built
Environ 2004; 13: 477–488.

70.

Nunayon SS, Zhang H, Lai ACK. Comparison of disinfection performance of UVC-LED and
conventional upper-room UVGI systems. Indoor Air 2020; 30: 180–191.

71.

Su C, Lau J, Gibbs SG. Student absenteeism and the comparisons of two sampling procedures for
culturable bioaerosol measurement in classrooms with and without upper room ultraviolet
germicidal irradiation devices. Indoor Built Environ 2014; 25: 551–562.

72.

Kowalski WJ, Walsh TJ, Petraitis V. 2020 COVID-19 Coronavirus Ultraviolet Susceptibility,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339887436_2020_COVID19_Coronavirus_Ultraviolet_Susceptibility (2020, accessed 9 March 2021).

73.

Kowalski WJ, Bahnfleth WP, Witham DL, Severin BF, Whittam TS. Mathematical Modeling of
Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation for Air Disinfection. Quant Microbiol 2000; 2: 249–270.

74.

McDevitt JJ, Rudnick SN, Radonovich LJ. Aerosol susceptibility of influenza virus to UV-C light.
Appl Environ Microbiol 2012; 78: 1666–1669.

75.

Mphaphlele M, Dharmadhikari AS, Jensen PA, Rudnick SN, van Reenen TH, Pagano MA,
Leuschner W, Sears TA, Milonova SP, van der Walt M, Stoltz AC, Weyer K, Nardell EA. Institutional
Tuberculosis Transmission. Controlled Trial of Upper Room Ultraviolet Air Disinfection: A Basis for
New Dosing Guidelines. Am J Respir Crit Care Med 2015; 192: 477–484.

76.

Noakes CJ, Beggs CB, Sleigh A. Effect of Room Mixing and Ventilation Strategy on the
Performance of Upper Room Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation Systems. IAQ Conf, Tampa, FL, ,
March 15-17, 2004,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268274237_Effect_of_Room_Mixing_and_Ventilatio
n_Strategy_on_the_Performance_of_Upper_Room_Ultraviolet_Germicidal_Irradiation_Systems
(2004).

77.

Noakes CJ, Khan MAI, Gilkeson CA. Modeling infection risk and energy use of upper-room
Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation systems in multi-room environments. Sci Technol Built Environ
2015; 21: 99–111.

35 | P a g e

78.

Rudnick SN, First MW. Fundamental Factors Affecting Upper-Room Ultraviolet Germicidal
Irradiation—Part II. Predicting Effectiveness. J Occup Environ Hyg 2007; 4: 352–362.

79.

Sung M, Kato S. Estimating the germicidal effect of upper-room UVGI system on exhaled air of
patients based on ventilation efficiency. Build Environ 2011; 46: 2326–2332.

80.

CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). Flu Vaccination Coverage, United States,
2018–19 Influenza Season, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/fluvaxview/coverage1819estimates.htm?web=1&wdLOR=c419B53C4-1DB7-4877-B9C7-5CFB577A2DF2 (2019,
accessed 8 March 2021).

81.

Jones JH. Notes On R0. Stanford University. 2007.

82.

Chen SC, Liao C-M. Cost-effectiveness of influenza control measures: a dynamic transmission
model-based analysis. Epidemiol Infect 2013; 141: 2581–2594.

83.

Branswell H. Comparing three Covid-19 vaccines: Pfizer, Moderna, Johnson & Johnson. Stat,
https://www.statnews.com/2021/02/02/comparing-the-covid-19-vaccines-developed-by-pfizermoderna-and-johnson-johnson/ (2021, accessed 16 March 2021).

84.

Skowronski DM, De Serres G. Safety and Efficacy of the BNT162b2 mRNA Covid-19 Vaccine
Correspondence. N Engl J Med. Epub ahead of print 17 February 2021. DOI:
10.1056/NEJMc2036242.

85.

Ledford H. J&J’s one-shot COVID vaccine offers hope for faster protection. Nature. Epub ahead of
print 29 January 2021. DOI: 10.1038/d41586-021-00119-7.

86.

Callaway E, Mallapaty S. Novavax offers first evidence that COVID vaccines protect people against
variants. Nature 2021; 590: 17–17.

87.

Lu J, Gu J, Li K, Xu C, Su W, Lai Z, Zhou D, Yu, Xu B, Yang Z. COVID-19 Outbreak Associated with Air
Conditioning in Restaurant, Guangzhou, China, 2020. Emerg Infect Dis J 2020; 26: 1628.

88.

Li Y, Qian H, Hang J, Chen X, Cheng P, Ling H, Wang S, Liang P, Li J, Xiao S, Wei J, Liu L, Cowling BJ,
Kang M. Probable airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a poorly ventilated restaurant. Build
Environ 2021; 196: 107788.

89.

Lu J, Yang Z. COVID-19 Outbreak Associated with Air Conditioning in Restaurant, Guangzhou,
China, 2020. Emerg Infect Dis J 2020; 26: 2789.

90.

Made-in-China. Shenzhen Eurostars Technology Co., Ltd. Horizontal Concealed Ceiling Exposed
Cassette Chilled Water Fan Coil Unit, https://eurostarschiller.en.made-inchina.com/product/CBDEKsnJfWkZ/China-Horizontal-Concealed-Ceiling-Exposed-CassetteChilled-Water-Fan-Coil-Unit.html (accessed 21 March 2021).

91.

To KK-W, Tsang OT-Y, Leung W-S, Tam, AR, Wu T-C, Lung DC, Yip CC-Y, Cai J-P, Chan JM-C, Chik
TS-H, Lau DP-L, Choi CY-C, Chen L-L, Chan W-M, Chan K-H, Ip JD, Ng AC-K, Poon RW-S, Luo CT,
Cheng VC-C, Chan JF-W, Hung IF-N, Chen Z, Chen H, Yuen K-Y. Temporal profiles of viral load in
posterior oropharyngeal saliva samples and serum antibody responses during infection by SARS-

36 | P a g e

CoV-2: an observational cohort study. Lancet Infect Dis 2020; 20: 565–574.
92.

van Doremalen N, Bushmaker T, Morris DH, Holbrook MG, Gamble A, Williamson BN, Tamin A,
Harcourt JL, Thornburg NJ, Gerber SI, Lloyd-Smith JO, de Wit E, Munster VJ. Aerosol and Surface
Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1. N Engl J Med 2020; 382: 1564–1567.

93.

Zou L, Ruan F, Huang M, Liang L, Huang H, Hong Z, Yu J, Kang M, Song Y, Xia J, Guo Q, Song T, He
J, Yen, H-L, Peiris M, Wu J. SARS-CoV-2 Viral Load in Upper Respiratory Specimens of Infected
Patients. N Engl J Med 2020; 382: 1177–1179.

37 | P a g e

